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ABSTRACT 
The individual differences in imagination ability in children with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) were tested in a sample of 14 children with ASD and 14 matched 
typically developing (TD) children. Analysis was conducted on the extent of 
imagination in symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. Aside from 
difficulties with imagination, children with ASD showed significant group deficits in 
executive function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) and 
false belief theory of mind understanding. Amongst children with ASD, executive 
function abilities (generativity and visuospatial planning) related to imaginative play 
and drawings. In contrast, amongst participants in the TD group, a mixture of both 
executive function (cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind 
understanding predicted imaginative ability. These results are discussed in terms of 
how executive control plays a broad and important role in imaginative ability across 
groups, but the contributions appear to be expressed and routed differently in ASD. 
The discussion also highlights the theoretical implications of not having theory of 
mind that underpin imagination in ASD. 
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There is one group of individuals for whom engagement in acts of spontaneity 
and fantasy in imagination appear to be formidably challenging: children with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD). ASD is a life-long pervasive developmental disorder, and 
despite a continuum of differing degrees of severity and variety of manifestations, 
individuals with this condition exhibit a triad of core impairments in social 
interaction, communication and imagination (Rutter, 1978; Wing & Gould, 1979). 
While there has been extensive research geared towards investigating the social 
interaction and communication deficit components of the triad, research focusing on 
understanding impairments in imagination in ASD has been less prominent (Craig, 
Baron-Cohen, & Scott, 2001; Frith, 2003). It is the purpose of this study to further 
examine imaginative ability in children with ASD in comparison to typically 
developing controls. Before turning to extant research literature on imagination in 
ASD, it is important to get an understanding of imagination and what the term itself 
means. Leslie’s (1987) conceptualization of imagination will be used to set the scene. 
 
 Imagination and meta-representation 
  
Imagination is a different construct from imagery, although imagery may be 
necessary for imagination. Imagery is a visual mental representation of a situation or 
event in the outside physical world (Kosslyn, Reiser, Farah, & Fiegel, 1983). When 
we create a visual image in our mind, the image of the object has a direct and 
relatively truthful relationship to that object. According to the cognitive 
developmental psychologist Alan Leslie (1987), there are three steps relating an initial 
visual mental image to an imaginative thought. At the first step, the image itself is 
generated through our visual system and visual cortex. This image becomes our 
primary representation of the object (i.e., an image that has true relations to a 
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particular object; e.g., looking at a fish and creating a visual image of a fish). In the 
second step, a mental copy of this primary representation is made. This duplicate (or 
as Leslie terms it – second-order representation) provides a version of the original 
image which can be manipulated and modified without corruption to the original 
primary representation. Finally in the third step, this second-order representation may 
be altered, where upon we can deliberately manipulate its truth relationships with the 
outside world. For example, we can delete the top half of the fish and replace it with a 
human torso to create a mermaid or we can add robotic arms and legs to the fish’s 
body to allow it to walk on land. These second-order representations of the “fish” do 
not have any true direct relations to real fish in the outside physical world. The 
primary representations are kept intact and separate from the second-order 
representations; in this way Leslie argues that we do not become confused about the 
true nature of objects. For Leslie, a key aspect of flexible imagination is the ability to 
modify second-order representations, providing the opportunity to uncover and 
consider infinite non-veridical possibilities. 
Leslie (1987) maintains that imagination critically involves steps two and 
three and that meta-representational theory of mind capacity lies at the heart of these 
two steps. Just as our primary representation of a fish has true direct relations to real 
fish in the outside physical world, our beliefs or propositional sentences (e.g., “cats 
can fly”) also have bearing on primary true relations of real world objects (cats cannot 
fly). When we deploy our theory of mind ability to put ourselves in someone’s shoes 
or infer a variety of mental states that cause action, we take the primary representation 
(e.g., “cats cannot fly”) (step 1), copy it as a second-order representation (step 2), and 
then insert a prefix (e.g., “John believes cats can fly”) (step 3) so that the 
representation’s true relations to the outside physical world changes. In this case, the 
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proposition (“cats can fly”) is true if John believes it, irrespective of us knowing that 
cats do not fly. According to Leslie, the meta-representational theory of mind capacity 
to consider decoupled second-order representations allows us to maintain our own 
knowledge base (cats do not fly) whilst representing someone else’s different false 
belief (John believes cats can fly) in the same way that, the theory of mind mechanism 
allows us to represent our own true perception of real world entities (this is a fish) 
whilst representing impossible imaginative ones (this is a mermaid). Development of 
an explicit meta-representational theory of mind has been shown to be stable at 
around 4- to 6- years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). This is also around 
the same time that typically developing children demonstrate an explicit 
understanding of the intentional nature of pretend play (e.g., Lillard, 1998, 2002; Ma 
& Lillard, 2006) and also explicit representational flexibility in producing impossible 
entity drawings (e.g., Hollis & Low, 2005; Low, 2006; Low & Hollis, 2003). More 
direct evidence favouring a theory of mind explanation of imagination include 
children with higher false belief reasoning scores employing more fantasy in their day 
to day lives (e.g., Taylor & Carlson, 1997) and frequently engaging in joint symbolic 
play with peers (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1995). Overall, one influential view 
stemming from Leslie’s account is that meta-representational understanding of theory 
of mind underpins the development of children’s diverse imaginative activities such 
as symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. 
 
Imagination in ASD 
 Following Leslie’s (1987) account, Baron-Cohen and colleagues have adopted 
the view that in order to engage in symbolic activities such as pretend play or 
impossible entity drawings, children need to first produce a primary mental 
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representation of the items for play or to be drawn (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1987; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Firth, 1985; Charman, Sweetenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird & 
Drew, 1998; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). A secondary copy representation of the 
primary representation can then be manipulated by the child and transformed into a 
novel object in the child’s mind (e.g., pretending that a block is a car or drawing a 
man with two heads). In order to engage in imagination the child must be able to 
understand that pretend play actions or impossible depictions are separate from their 
true primary representations. Baron-Cohen and his colleagues also proposed that the 
meta-representational theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) underpinning imagination 
has a modular neuro-cognitive architecture that may be severely impaired in ASD. 
 In the influential study by Baron-Cohen (1987), levels of spontaneous pretend 
play in children with autism (CWA) were compared to children with Down’s 
syndrome and typically developing (TD) controls. In this study, participants were 
presented with three different categories of toys and video-taped for 15 minutes (5 
minutes with each toy group). The toy categories in this study were: (1) stuffed 
animals and wooden bricks; (2) a kitchen set and a green sponge; and (3) a set of 
commercially available play people. Scores on play practices were recorded into 
categories ranging from sensori-motor to symbolic. Symbolic play is seen as 
attributing properties to the object that it does not have (including referring to absent 
objects as if they were present), or using it as if it were something else (e.g., 
pretending a brick was a toy car). CWA produced significantly less symbolic play 
than both matched control groups. This result was presented as evidence that there is a 
deficit in the production of symbolic pretend play specific to autism. Scott and Baron-
Cohen (1996) also assessed imagination deficits in autism through Karmiloff-Smith’s 
(1990) seminal “Draw an Impossible Person’ task. Findings from this study showed 
Imaginative Ability  5 
 
that CWA (in comparison with TD children and children with moderate learning 
disability (MLD)), failed at drawing impossible pictures. Instead of impossible 
people, CWA drew real looking people. These results have also been replicated by 
Craig, Baron-Cohen and Scott (2001) with children in the subgroup towards the 
higher end of the autism spectrum of Asperger’s Syndrome. Interpreting these results 
alongside a wealth of parallel research showing abnormalities in theory of mind 
understanding in ASD, Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2000; 
Craig et al., 2001; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996) suggested that their observations of 
ASD impairments in imagination could be explained as deficits in understanding how 
beliefs are necessarily representational and can be decoupled from reality. 
 The view that imagination impairments are due to a limitation in theory of 
mind understanding has, however, been challenged by researchers who view 
difficulties with understanding mental states as themselves being attributable to a 
domain general deficit in executive functioning. For example, problems with 
inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and generativity have all been found to relate to 
difficulties with false belief reasoning amongst children with ASD (Hill, 2004; 
McEvoy, Rogers & Pennington, 1993; Russell Saltmarsh & Hill, 1999). In response 
to Baron-Cohen’s (1987) study into imagination difficulties, Lewis and Boucher 
(1988) have criticized the findings to be the result of inadequate language ability 
matching between groups. According to Lewis and Boucher, lack of appropriate 
group matching led to floor effects in the symbolic play produced by CWA. Upon 
carefully matching groups on language ability, Lewis and Boucher found no 
difference between CWA and control participants when instructional prompts were 
provided (e.g., “What can these do? Show me what you can do with these”). 
However, the lack of group differences in Lewis and Boucher’s study was primarily 
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attributable to the absence of symbolic play across all groups. Lewis and Boucher 
suggested that the props used in their study may not have been age appropriate to the 
participants and thus restricted the symbolic play of all the children. Upon refining 
Lewis and Boucher’s task materials and also providing participants with instructional 
cues, Jarrold, Boucher and Smith (1996) found that CWA showed higher levels of 
symbolic play that were comparable to control counterparts. Jarrold et al. noted that 
CWA still produced symbolic play at a slower rate than controls. Executive function 
researchers have used these findings as a whole (that CWA can produce more 
symbolic play under cued conditions) to argue that CWA do understand pretend play 
but have problems in generating ideas for pretend play (Jarrold et al., 1996).   
 The process of simplifying the task by introducing instructional cues has also 
crossed over into imagination research focusing on impossible entity drawings. 
Leevers and Harris (1998) using a picture completion task reported that all groups 
(TD, CWA and moderate learning disability (MLD)) performed accurately in 
applying patterns that would classify a drawing as being impossible looking (e.g., 
colouring a snowman black; putting zebra stripes on a giraffe). In essence, their 
picture completion task made the Karmiloff-Smith (1990) drawing requirement 
simpler in that children only had to add elements to complete a picture rather than 
produce a whole picture from scratch. In the Leevers and Harris study, CWA also 
showed that they were able to identify and separate real looking pictures from 
impossible looking pictures. Consequently, Leevers and Harris proposed that an 
executive based difficulty, rather than in imagination or mental state understanding, 
underpins the deficit in completing impossible entity drawings. Specifically, Leevers 
and Harris believe that a separate limitation in the ability to carry out situational 
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visuospatial plans lies at the heart of CWA’s difficulties in producing entire novel 
drawings.  
 In reply, Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989; Craig, 
Baron-Cohen & Scott, 2001) have commented that the instructed pretend play 
conditions used by Lewis and Boucher, 1988 / Jarrold et al. (1996) and the modified 
impossible entity drawing tasks used by Leevers and Harris (1998) may have been too 
easy and argued that if there is an imaginative impairment per se, the task focus 
should be on spontaneous pretend play or spontaneous drawings where children are 
required to explicitly manipulate knowledge structures in hypothetical ways. 
Unfortunately, much of the extant studies on imagination in ASD have concentrated 
only on demonstrating or challenging the magnitude of group differences in 
impossible entity drawings or symbolic play against a background of research into 
theory of mind versus executive dysfunction. If a particular cognitive deficit is 
principally responsible for imagination deficits in ASD, then variance in the display 
of that cognitive skill should be related to the extent and variability of imagination 
shown. 
 
Attempts to specify the cognitive underpinnings of imagination 
   One study by Rutherford and Rogers (2003) has gone beyond documenting 
group success or deficits in imagination by studying whether theory of mind or 
executive function abilities are actually correlated with imagination performance. 
Given that the present project has a similar aim to Rutherford and Rogers’ work, 
careful consideration of their findings is required. Replicating previous research, 
Rutherford and Rogers found that CWA produced significantly less symbolic pretend 
play than overall mental age matched control groups (TD and children with general 
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developmental disabilities (DD)). They did not find any significant difference in joint 
attention between the CWA and TD groups, although the autism group had lower 
joint attention scores than the DD group. They also did not find any group differences 
in generativity or cognitive flexibility between CWA and the control groups. In 
relation to generativity and cognitive flexibility, these findings directly contradict 
several studies that have found ASD impairments in generativity (e.g., Bishop, & 
Norbury, 2002; Turner, 1997, 1999) and cognitive flexibility (e.g., Colvert, Custance, 
Swettenham, 2002; Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 2002). 
 One problem with Rutherford and Rogers’ (2003) study is that they did not 
specifically match groups on verbal mental age (VMA). Given that language ability is 
actively recruited by TD children for flexibly integrating and shifting cognitive set 
(Jacques & Zelazo, 2005) and children with ASD routinely fail to rely on language for 
servicing executive control (Joseph, McGrath, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005), it is not clear 
whether failure to find group differences in generativity and set-shifting may be 
masked by the lack of group matching on general verbal ability. Due to 
developmental language delay present in ASD, any study looking into imagination 
would need to control for variance associated with individual differences in verbal 
ability (Jarrold, 2003).  
Yet another significant problem is that Rutherford and Roger’s (2003) 
generativity task measured play rather than generativity per se. Their generativity 
measure involved observing participants’ spontaneous behavioural responses to 
different toys (e.g. when given a slinky, different responses such as sensorimotor 
squeezing, throwing and separating strands were scored as instances of novel 
behaviour). In contrast, studies that have found ASD deficits in generativity have used 
known tests of ideational fluency to tap the ability to generate new and imaginative 
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responses in addition to the ability to access and manipulate stored knowledge. For 
example, in Turner’s (1999) Uses of Objects generativity task, children with ASD 
were asked to name as many possible uses of a given object (e.g., a newspaper) in a 
certain time period. Here it is possible to produce either common uses of the object 
(e.g., read it) or highly imaginative suggestions (e.g., for use as wallpaper, to keep 
warm). Although both types of response are correct, the latter class of response shows 
participants to be truly generative in the sense of looking at the situation from new 
perspectives and identifying new possibilities. Turner found that children with ASD 
had very low generativity scores as they could not combine and modify existing 
knowledge in their semantic network to generate uncommon imaginative ideas.  
A final problem with Rutherford and Rogers’ (2003) study is that even though 
they failed to find group differences in measures of executive function, data from all 
groups were still combined in conducting a regression analysis. Their combined 
regression analysis showed that even after the effects of overall mental age were 
factored out in the first block, only generativity (and not joint attention) in the second 
block accounted for unique variance in predicting spontaneous pretend play (they 
failed to factor out chronological age). As their result was yielded for the entire 
participant sample, the findings cannot be taken as specific to understanding the 
cognitive underpinnings of imagination in ASD. Further research is therefore required 
using separate pretend play and generativity measures in order to disambiguate 
Rutherford and Rogers’ findings. If there is a link between generativity and symbolic 
pretend play, this association has not yet been directly shown, and is hence in need of 
further investigation.  
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Present study 
 Using correlational analyses, the main aim of the current project was to assess 
presumed links between individual differences in imagination ability with executive 
function versus theory of mind. In addition, while there is research exploring the 
ability of children with ASD at the group level to produce imaginative drawings as 
well as studies into symbolic play ability, no study has yet focused on investigating 
the cognitive underpinnings of both these constructs at the same time. By examining 
both pretend play and impossible entity drawing capabilities in children with ASD as 
compared to TD children, a clearer understanding of the cognitive processes involved 
in the development of imaginative flexibility may be revealed. 
 Based on Baron-Cohen and his colleagues’ contention that imagination 
impairment may be a reflection of impairments in meta-representational mental state 
understanding (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1987; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996), individual 
differences in symbolic pretend play and imaginative drawing in the ASD group 
should be straightforwardly related to variation in false belief attribution. However, 
several lines of evidence have converged to present a formidable challenge against 
such an expectation. 
 First, parallel to evidence of sophisticated prompted play in autism, the 
developmental literature on pictorial skills indicates that even young TD children can, 
through example priming, show above average performance in the range and 
complexity of imaginative ideas depicted (e.g., Berti & Freeman, 1997; Hollis & 
Low, 2005; Low, 2006; Zhi, Thomas, & Robinson, 1997). As reported earlier, group 
differences in the application of imaginative drawing ideas between ASD and TD 
children can even disappear under prompted conditions (e.g., Leevers & Harris, 
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1998). Second, various measures of language ability have been found to correlate with 
standard false belief theory of mind measures, in both ASD and in typical 
development (e.g., Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Astington & Baird, 2005; Milligan, 
Astington, & Dack, 2007). Fisher et al. further reported that the correlation between 
receptive grammar ability and false belief comprehension is even stronger in ASD 
than in typical development. They suggested that CWA use and depend on language 
as a means for scaffolding mental state understanding. Such evidence implies that the 
strength of the contended ASD correlation linking false belief theory of mind 
understanding and imagination may become non-significant once variance due to 
receptive language (and chronological age) is removed. Furthermore, while there is a 
strong association between language and executive function in typical development 
(e.g., Hughes, 1996; Jacques & Zelazo, 2005), children with ASD do not appear to 
reliably use or depend on language for the service of executive control (e.g., Joseph, 
McGrath, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Russell, 1997). These findings, suggest that 
variations in executive function would remain uniquely related to the display of 
imagination in ASD even after variance due to receptive language (and chronological 
age) are partialed out. Consequently, in the current project it was hypothesised that 
variations in imagination ability would be uniquely linked to executive function 
performance for the ASD group relative to the matched TD control group. The study 
of executive function in relation to imagination in ASD must be constrained, however, 
as executive control as a construct on its own is too broad, and would tell us little 
about precise mechanisms underpinning achievements in imagination. Fortunately, 
extant evidence highlights at least two particular executive function skills that may be 
important for imagination in ASD: generativity and planning. 
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 Generativity and planning underpinning imagination  
With respect to pretend play in ASD, Turner (1997) has argued that 
generativity (the ability to generate novel ideas) is a key locus of difficulty where 
virtual symbolic production is concerned. Her theoretical position may be supported 
by several lines of evidence that was reviewed earlier indicating that: (1) CWA 
produce pretend play acts at a slower rate than control counterparts (e.g., Jarrold, 
Boucher & Smith, 1996) and (2) external prompts can help CWA engage in pretence 
and entertain counterfactual propositions (e.g., Lewis & Boucher, 1988). Beyond 
pretend play, the relevance of generativity for imagination via drawings comes from 
additional studies by Lewis and Boucher (1991) and Turner (1999). Lewis and 
Boucher found that the successive pictures of everyday objects produced by CWA 
showed a high degree of thematic relatedness, as compared to control participants. 
Turner (1999), upon asking CWA of different ability levels to generate as many 
interpretations as possible for meaningless two dimensional patterns, found that 
participants were less likely than control subjects to generate novel responses. The 
salience of generativity for flexible symbolic production has primarily been tested and 
supported with respect to pretend play in ASD by Rutherford and Rogers (2003), and 
their findings, as reviewed here, were ambiguous at best. In spite of this, given 
Turner’s (1999) work showing ASD generativity deficits in novel interpretation of 
meaningless patterns, it was predicted that variations in generativity would also relate 
to individual differences in symbolic pretend play and drawing impossible entities in 
ASD. 
 It is also possible that the relationship between generativity and imagination in 
ASD is mediated by a third factor. Leevers and Harris (1998) have specifically 
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postulated that spontaneous imaginative drawings are difficult for CWA because such 
displays require the micro-deployment of new and potentially complex visuospatial 
plans. Due to distinct planning challenges faced by CWA, participants may instead 
choose to re-execute easy and already familiar graphic procedures. Leevers and 
Harris’ reasoning fits with research on drawings by TD children showing that 
visuospatial planning (e.g., shape similarity and contrast, shape and line connection, 
axis orientation) is also an important control factor involved in novel picture 
production (e.g., Freeman, 1987; Low & Hollis, 2003; Thomas & Silk, 1990). The 
success of CWA on imaginative picture completion tasks that reduce planning 
demands is consistent with research showing that CWA have shown group deficits on 
measures of visuospatial planning (e.g., Prior & Hoffmann, 1990). This would mean 
that, even if individuals with ASD are able to generate novel imaginative drawing 
ideas, they may not be able to translate those ideas onto paper without a certain level 
of visuospatial planning ability. In the imaginative drawing task used by Scott and 
Baron-Cohen (1996), both generativity and planning may turn out to be important 
executive ingredients for successful problem solving. Weaving together Leevers and 
Harris’ work on planning as a critical sub-component of the drawing process with 
Turner’s (1999) findings on broader generativity deficits in ASD pattern 
categorization, it was specifically hypothesized that the relationship between 
generativity and impossible entity drawings in the ASD group would even be 
mediated through variations in visuospatial planning ability.   
It is less evident that planning would necessarily mediate the relationship 
between generativity and symbolic pretend play amongst children with ASD. A 
fascinating study by Lillard (1996) indicated that TD kindergarten and young primary 
school children showed an appreciation and recognition of the physical action plans 
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involved in pretend play (e.g., pretending to be a puppy simply involves barking first 
and then sitting later), and that the mind is needed for translating plans into action 
(e.g., “I think what I want to play and then I start playing it”, p. 1720). However, 
whilst young children understood that action generation and planning were involved 
in preparing for pretence, they did not recognize that meta-representations were 
additionally involved in actualizing pretence. The young children in Lillard’s study 
reported that the actual execution of pretend play did not involve the mind, brain or 
combinations of mind and body. For example, one 8-year-old insisted that the actual 
play-pretending to be mothers required only a body and not mental engagement 
because to do so only required one to “cook, wash floors, go to work, [and then …] 
send someone to their room” (p. 1725). Lillard’s findings guided and refined the 
current project’s predictions in two ways.  
First, since executive capabilities in action generation and planning are 
implicated in pretend play, it was expected that variability in such skills would be 
related to individual differences in symbolic play in the ASD group. However, as 
compared the drawing modality where fine graphic visuospatial skills are necessary, 
planning may not need to specifically mediate ideational fluency to bring about gross 
symbolic pretend play with toys and objects. Hence, for the ASD group, separate to 
the process required for imaginative drawings, it was predicted that generativity and 
planning would not necessarily relate in a mediational fashion to link with symbolic 
pretend play. As to the manner by which imaginative drawings may unfold in ASD, 
contributing variance in generativity was predicted to be mediated through variance in 
visuospatial planning capability. Contrastingly, generativity and visuospatial planning 
capabilities were predicted to be independently linked to symbolic pretend play in 
ASD. Moreover, given that children with ASD tend to have enhanced perceptual 
Imaginative Ability  15 
 
abilities for certain stimuli, tend to be visual problem solvers, and use non-mentalistic 
means of solving theory of mind tasks (e.g., Fisher et al., 2005; Kana, Keller. 
Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2006; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 
2006), it is not unreasonable to expect that variations in imagination (via play and 
drawings) may turn out to be especially related to variations in visuospatial planning 
ability in ASD compared to the TD control group.    
A second key point arising from Lillard’s (1996) findings is that even though 
young TD children easily generate and carry out plans involved in pretend play, there 
is a slowly emerging watershed in children’s categorization of pretence that coalesces 
around an understanding of how minds are necessarily representational in nature. 
Consequently, for the TD group, it was hypothesized that false belief theory of mind 
understanding would also be centrally related to the extent of symbolic pretend play 
and imaginative drawing expression.  
 
Cognitive flexibility additionally underpinning imagination  
Impairments in generativity and planning do not succeed in accounting for all 
aspects of imagination ability in ASD. Imagination might also require other executive 
skills, for example, cognitive flexibility – the ability to coordinate multiple conflicting 
interpretations (of toys or drawings) at the same time (Jaques & Zelazo, 2005). 
Notably, children with ASD also show deficits in tasks measuring cognitive flexibility 
such as the Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS; a variant of the Wisconsin 
Card Sort test) (e.g., Colvert et al., 2002; Zelazo, Jaques, Burack, & Frye, 2002; see 
also Ozonoff, Cook, Coon, Dawson, Joseph, Klin et al., 2004, for similar findings 
using a different measure). At a broader theoretical level, Zelazo (2004; Zelazo & 
Müller, 2002; Zelazo et al., 2002) theorized that cognitive flexibility in integrating 
Imaginative Ability  16 
 
complex hierarchically embedded rules through self-directed speech may even assist 
children in tracking ideational fluency and hence be more generative (“If I have said 
that a newspaper can be used to make a fire then I should say that a newspaper can be 
used as wallpaper”) or assist children’s spatial plans (“If I put the largest disc on this 
peg, and if this smaller disk is on that peg, then I need to put the smallest disk on the 
other peg”).  
Zelazo’s (2004) theoretical view that several unique phenomenological 
measures of executive function such as generativity and planning (and even going so 
far as to include measures of theory of mind) may be reducible to general cognitive 
flexibility is controversial. His perspective is facing strong theoretical challenges not 
only from theory of mind researchers (see Kloo & Perner, 2005) but also from 
executive function researchers (see Carlson, 2003). Given on-going debate 
surrounding whether cognitive flexibility could actually subsume domain specific and 
domain general measures of thought and reasoning, this project takes a neutral view 
by simply including cognitive flexibility as another separate measure of executive 
function which may be correlated to imagination in ASD (Rutherford & Rogers, 
2003). A second broad prediction of this current project was that, following the 
executive function explanation of imagination in ASD, cognitive flexibility (alongside 
generativity and planning) would be predictive of individual differences in symbolic 
play and impossible entity drawing attempts. 
Whilst Lillard’s (1996) study suggests that generativity and planning may not 
be critical watershed control factors involved in symbolic action implementation 
amongst TD children, there is other evidence indicating that cognitive flexibility 
could turn out to be relevant for imagination at other stages. Indeed, Carlson and 
Moses (2001) reported that children’s success in action pantomime (e.g., using finger 
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as toothbrush substitute when asked to pretend to brush one’s teeth) was correlated 
with a combined battery measure of executive control that included the DCCS task. 
Separating out the DCCS as a distinct measure, Dick, Overton and Kovacs (2005) 
found positive but small correlations between action pantomime and the DCCS. The 
authors suggest that cognitive flexibility (as tapped by the DCCS) may help children 
coordinate, shift between, and integrate multiple representations during action 
pantomime specifically and symbolic activities generally. Dick et al. also found, 
dovetailing with Lillard’s findings, that false belief theory of mind understanding was 
uniquely related to action pantomime. Unfortunately, all these correlations 
disappeared when chronological age was partialled out. The disappearance of the 
correlations upon partial analysis may be due to the incompatibility of the variance in 
the action pantomime task in relation to the variance in the other tasks. Consecutive 
coordination of representations are often needed in theory of mind and DCCS tasks 
(e.g., from previous perspective and then to current perspective; from previous rule 
and then to current rule) compared to the simultaneous coordination of 
representations need for pantomime tasks (e.g., using finger as toothbrush). Indeed, 
Dick et al. suggest that the supportive foundations provided by theory of mind and 
cognitive flexibility may yet be observed when using imagination type tasks that 
require consecutive coordination (e.g., extended free play using a variety of objects). 
Dick et al.’s findings are important in the sense that their data suggest that theory of 
mind and particular aspects of executive function such as cognitive flexibility may be 
relevant to how imagination typically unfolds in development. Consequently, it was 
predicted that aside from the executive skills of generativity and planning, variance in 
cognitive flexibility would so related to individual differences in imagination in the 
ASD and TD groups.      
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Summary  
In this project, imagination in ASD was measured through pretend play and 
Karmiloff-Smith’s (1990) impossible entity drawing task. A standard unprompted 
protocol was used for both domains as Baron-Cohen and colleagues have maintained 
that impairments in representing non-veridical content can only be detected and 
understood through such a procedure. However, this does not rule out the proposal 
that executive functioning may have considerable performance-competence 
implications for imagination, especially if this project uncovers, as was hypothesised 
here, that variations in imagination seen for children with ASD would be more 
strongly associated with generativity, planning and cognitive flexibility than 
compared to associations with false belief theory of mind reasoning. To summarize, 
the main hypotheses of this project were as follows: 
 
For the ASD group - 
H1.  Compared to false belief theory of mind understanding, variation in executive 
function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) would be 
more strongly related to individual differences in imagination. 
H1.1.  For drawings specifically, visuospatial planning was predicted to 
mediate the relationship between generativity and extent of 
imaginative drawing content. 
For the TD group - 
H2.  Executive function and theory of mind were predicted to be related to individual 
differences in imagination. 
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Method 
Participants 
 The ASD participants with were recruited though Autism New Zealand and 
Intellectual Disability Empowerment in Action (IDEA) Wellington. The typically 
developing children were recruited through local mainstream schools. Each 
participant with ASD had been diagnosed under DSMIV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) criteria by at least two of a clinical psychologist, a paediatrician 
and a speech pathologist. As a check, the probability of autism and Asperger’s 
syndrome and the degree of severity were confirmed using the caregiver questionnaire 
of the Gilliam Autism Rating Scale – Second Edition (GARS-2) (Gilliam, 2006) and 
the Gilliam Asperger’s Disorder Scale (GADS) (Gilliam, 2001) respectively. GARS-2 
and GADS were used as they reflect the most current definitions of ASD and have 
been revised to address criticisms of the original evaluative instruments (Hoffman, 
Sweeney, Gilliam, & Lopez-Wagner, 2006). For the autism group (n = 9) and the 
Asperger’s group (n = 5), all participants’ GARS-2 and GADS index scores were 
greater than cut-off points. Based on teacher reports, none of the control participants 
had a neurological or developmental disorder. The present study consisted of 28 
participants. There were fourteen participants in the ASD group (1 female, 13 males; 
mean CA = 8 years 7 months; mean VMA = 9 years 10 months; mean non-verbal 
ability NVA = 27.71). There were fourteen typically developing controls (1 female, 
13 males; mean CA = 7 years 3 months; mean VMA = 10 years 1 month; mean NVA 
= 23.71). Participants in the control group were selected to match participants in the 
ASD group on gender, VMA (via the Peabody Picture Vocabulary task), as well as 
NVA (via the Coloured Matrices) (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1993).  
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Procedure 
 Children in the ASD group participated in a battery of measures over three 
sessions with the researcher, with each session spaced approximately one week apart. 
Sessions with the ASD group took place in the child’s home in order to maintain a 
natural environment. Tasks were semi-randomly organized across sessions, but the 
order was the same across participants to ensure comparability of groups. The first 
session involved the administration of tasks relating to verbal and non-verbal skills 
along with imaginative drawing. The second sessions involved the child engaging in 
measures relating to theory of mind and executive function. In session three, 
participants took part in a test of symbolic pretend play. Sessions lasted no more than 
45 minutes. The control group participated in sessions conducted in an allocated room 
at the participants’ schools. Test sessions for the control group followed the order of 
the ASD group.  
 
Verbal Ability 
Verbal mental age (VMA) scores for all participants were obtained from 
administration of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary task: third edition (PPVT-III) 
(Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  
 
Non-Verbal Ability 
Non-verbal ability (NVA) scores for all participants were obtained from 
administration of the Ravens Progressive Matrices (children’s colour version) (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 1998). Participants were presented with 36 trials in which they had 
to choose the best alternative (from six alternatives) to complete the picture/pattern 
presented. Raw NVA scores were used to match groups.   
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Executive Function 
 Cognitive flexibility: The Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS, Zelazo, 
2006) is a task specifically designed to test the cognitive flexibility of children in the 
same way as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is administered to adults. In 
this task participants were presented with two clear square trays placed side by side on 
the table in front of them. A target card stood at the back of each tray facing the 
participants. On one target card the child was presented with a picture of a blue rabbit 
while the other showed a picture of a red boat. These target cards were fixed and 
remained in position for the duration of the task. 
Each participant was then administered three separate phases consecutively. In 
the first phase, the child was shown one of two test cards, one with the picture of a red 
rabbit and one with a blue boat. The instruction was then given for the child to sort the 
cards by colour. As an example the researcher then showed the participant a picture of 
the red rabbit and placed it face down in the tray with the target picture of a red boat. 
This was followed by showing the participant the same process with the blue boat. 
The trial continued with the child having to sort a further six test cards (three of each 
colour) into the correct trays. Participants need to score 6 out of 6 in order to move to 
the second phase. The second phase followed the same procedure as the first, but this 
time the task context was switched and participants were now given the instruction to 
sort the cards by shape (e.g., the red rabbit goes in the tray with the blue rabbit target 
card). A score of 5 out of 6 is required in order to progress to the third phase. 
In the final third phase, each participant is shown a new set of test cards. Each 
card continues to have a picture of a red rabbit or a blue boat. In addition, 50% of the 
test cards in this phase have a thick black border around the edges of the card. The 
participant is then given the instruction that each card with a black border must be 
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sorted by colour and each card that does not have a black border must be sorted by 
shape. A demonstration of the correct placing of each of the four possible test cards 
was then completed showing the participants the new sorting rules. Each participant is 
then presented with 12 test cards and must correctly sort 9 of the 12 in order to pass 
the final phase. A score of 1, 2 or 3 was given in relation to haw many phases each 
participant successfully completed. 
At this point it is important to state that there were no group differences 
between the two groups on the DCCS when scores were calculated out of 3 over the 
three phases. One possible reason for the lack of group differences on the DCCS may 
be due to both groups successfully completing the pre- and post-switch phase of the 
DCCS (phases one and two).  Indeed, there were no between group differences when 
looking at mean scores over the first two phases alone (p > .05): the pre- and post-
switch phases may have been too easy for both groups. The first two phases of the 
DCCS is routinely used to assess cognitive flexibility in rule use amongst young 
children less than 5 years of age. Given that in the current study the mean 
chronological age of both groups was around 7 to 8 years, scores from phases 1 and 2 
may artificially deflate potential group differences in cognitive flexibility. 
Fortunately, the DCCS comes with a third more challenging phase (the 12 border 
trials); this final phase of the task has previously been used successfully with older 
chronologically aged children and also with adults to measure continuous 
developmental changes in cognitive flexibility (Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & 
Zelazo, 2005). This study therefore limited participants’ scores on cognitive flexibility 
to cover only the border trials at the final phase of the DCCS (scores out of 12). The 
border trial scores were used in all subsequent analyses. 
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 Visuospatial planning: The objective of the Tower Test (Delis, Kaplin, & 
Kramer, 2001) is to construct a designated tower by moving discs of varying sizes 
between a set of three pegs in as few moves as possible. In order to complete the task 
correctly each participant must follow two pre-directed rules: (1) only one disc can be 
moved at a time, and (2) a larger disc may not be placed on top of a smaller disc. 
During the test the participant proceeds through a maximum of nine trials; each trial 
becoming progressively more complex, with the test discontinued after 3 consecutive 
trial failures. Trials one to three involved two disks and a time limit of 30 seconds. 
Trials four and five used three disks with 60 and 120 seconds time limit respectively. 
Trials six and seven involved four disks with 120 and 180 seconds time limit. The 
final two trials used all five disks with a 240 seconds time limit. Failure on a trial was 
indicated by the participant either: (1) exceeding the time limit for the individual trial; 
or (2) non completion of the trial. 
 For each trial the participant was presented with the three pegs and the discs to 
be used pre-loaded in a predetermined position. The participant was then presented 
with a picture indicating the final position of the discs. The instruction was then given 
for the participant to “make your tower look like the one in the picture”. Each 
participant was timed from start to completion and the total number of moves was 
recorded. The combination of completion time and total number of moves was used to 
generate an achievement score for each trial. By adding these scores a total 
visuospatial planning score was obtained (range = 0 to 30).  
 
 Generativity:  The ability to generate diverse novel ideas was measured by 
two ideational fluency tasks taken from Turner (1999) - Uses of Objects and Pattern 
meanings. Results from a combined score on these two measures have been shown to 
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be especially sensitive towards detecting limitations in generativity in autism (Bishop 
& Norbury, 2005). In the Uses of Objects task, participants were shown one object at 
a time and asked to generate uses for which it could be put: a brick, a cup, a pencil, a 
piece of doweling, a piece of fabric, and a piece of elastic. The first three objects had 
obvious conventional uses while the later three did not. Order of presentation of 
conventional and non-conventional objects was counterbalanced, but within each 
object group, the order of items remained the same. For each conventional item, a 
typical use (e.g., a cup could be used to drink from) and a novel use (e.g., a cup could 
be used as a dolls hat) were given. For each non-conventional item, a novel use was 
suggested (e.g., a piece of elastic could be used as a catapult). Following the example 
suggestions, participants were invited to: “tell me all the other ways you think a 
[object] could be useful”. Participants were given 2½ minutes for each object. 
Following Bishop and Norbury, each idea was coded as either a correct response (a 
plausible use, such as using a piece of cloth to make a doll’s shirt), incorrect 
responses (a vague or implausible use, such as eating a brick), a repetition (identical 
to a previous response for that specific item or any previous item), a redundant use 
(varying in some small way from a previous response, such as a brick could be used 
to make a shed after saying it could be used to make a house) or a not-useful response 
(such as carry the brick). 
 The second generativity task, Pattern Meanings, used five meaningless line 
drawings, each printed on separate pieces of paper. Each participant was presented 
with one practice item and five test items. For the practice item, the examiner asked, 
“What could this look like?” Responses were praised and other suggestion prompts 
were offered such as: “a hedgehog” and “a brush”. Participants were then shown the 
test stimuli one by one, and for each design were asked to think of as many things as 
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possible that it could be. Each participant was given 2½ minutes to respond to each 
item. Bishop and Norbury’s (2005) scoring instructions were adopted and responses 
were coded as correct response (a plausible interpretation), an incorrect response (a 
vague or implausible interpretation), a repetition or a redundant response. 
 Agreement between two independent raters coding over 1165 responses across the 
Use of Objects and Pattern Meanings tasks was 94%. All differences were resolved 
upon discussion. In agreement with Bishop and Norbury (2005), there was a 
significant correlation between the Use of Objects and Pattern Meanings tasks for the 
proportion of correct responses (r = 0.49, N = 28, p < .01). Following Bishop and 
Norbury, then, the mean proportion of correct responses across both tasks were taken 
as a measure of generativity. 
 
Theory of Mind 
First-Order Unexpected Contents (adapted from Perner, Frith, Leslie, & 
Leekham 1989): A matchbox was shown to each participant and they were then 
asked, “What do you think is inside here?” When the child responded with “matches” 
or something similar (e.g. “fire sticks”), the container was opened and a coin removed 
(“Look, it’s a coin inside”). The coin was placed back inside and the matchbox 
closed. The child was then asked the self false-belief question: “What did you think 
was inside when I first showed you the box and it was all closed up like this?” A 
puppet was then introduced to the child: “This is Sally. Sally hasn’t seen inside this 
box. When Sally sees the box all closed up like this, what will Sally think is inside?” 
To pass the false-belief for other (i.e., Sally) question, participants were required to 
predict that Sally would expect the contents of the matchbox to be matches or 
something similar. All participants were then asked the reality control question: What 
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is inside the box right now? All participants passed the reality control question. 
Participants were awarded a maximum score of 2 for correct responses to both false-
belief questions. 
 
 First-Order Unexpected Transfer (adapted from Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith 1985): The researcher introduced two different hand puppets by saying, “This is 
Emma and this is John.” The researcher then places Emma down and John down on 
the table. The researcher then took out a yellow container and placed it in front of 
Emma saying, “Here’s a yellow container”. The researcher then took out a blue 
container and placed it in front of John saying, “Here’s a blue container”. The 
researcher then picks up Emma and uses the hand puppet to place a toy car into the 
yellow container saying, “Emma puts her toy car into the yellow container. Then 
Emma goes away”. The researcher hides Emma away from view. The researcher then 
picks up John and uses the hand puppet to move the toy car from the yellow container 
into the blue container saying, “Now John takes the toy car and hides it in the blue 
container. Then John goes away”. The researcher then hides John from view. The 
Emma puppet is then brought back into view and placed sitting down between the 
yellow and blue containers, with the researcher saying, “Emma has come back now”. 
The following questions were then asked: 
 False-Belief question: “Where will Emma look first for the toy car?” 
 Reality control question: “Where is the toy car really?” 
 Memory control question: “Where was the toy car in the beginning?” 
Participants received a score of 0 or 1 for the false-belief question. All 
participants passed the control questions. 
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Second-Order James & Lauren task (Baron-Cohen, 1989): For the second-
order false belief task, the study employed the use of a model village and villagers. 
The story narrated was taken from Baron-Cohen’s (1989) study and the procedure is 
set out below: 
“This is James and this is Lauren. They live in this village”. 
Naming Question: “Which is James? Which is Lauren?” 
“Here they are in the park. Along comes the snack-truck man. James wants to buy 
some chips but has left his money at home. He is very sad. “Don’t worry”, says the 
snack-truck man, “You can go home and get your money, and buy some chips later. 
I’ll be waiting in the park all day”. “Oh good”, says James, ‘I’ll be back in the 
afternoon to buy some chips”.” 
Prompt question 1: “Where did the snack-truck man say to James he would be all 
afternoon?” 
“So James goes home (the researcher moves James to his model house). He lives in 
this house. Now the snack-truck man tells Lauren, “I am going to drive my van to the 
church to see if I can sell my snacks outside there”.” 
Prompt question 2: “Where did the snack-truck man say he was going?” 
Prompt question 3: “Did James hear that?” 
“The snack-truck man drives over to the church. On his way he passes James’s house 
(researcher moves the snack-truck van and man to James’s house). James sees him 
and says, “Where are you going?” The snack-truck man says, “I’m going to sell some 
snacks outside the church.” So off he drives to the church (researcher moves the van 
and man to the church). So James goes to the church to buy some chips. 
Prompt question 4: “Where did the snack-truck man tell James he was going?” 
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Prompt question 5: “Does Lauren know that the snack-truck man has talked to 
James?” 
 “Now Lauren goes home (researcher moves Lauren to her model house). She lives in 
this house. Then she goes to James’s house (researcher moves Lauren to James’s 
model house). She knocks on the door and says, “Is James in?” James’ mother says, 
“No he’s not in. James has gone out to buy some chips.” 
Belief question: “Where does Lauren think James has gone to buy some chips?” 
Justification question: “Why?” 
Reality question: “Where did James really go to buy his chips?” 
Memory question: “Where was the snack-truck man in the beginning?” 
All participants passed the prompt and control questions. If participants 
answered the belief question correctly, they received a score of 1. Responses to the 
justification question were scored according to criteria set out by Baron-Cohen 
(1989). Participants received a justification score of 2 if they mentioned both James 
and Lauren’s perspectives. Participants received a justification score of 1 if they only 
mentioned either James or Lauren’s perspectives. If participants did not mention 
either character’s perspectives, then a justification score of 0 was given. Summing 
across the belief and justification questions, participants could receive a total 
maximum score of 3.  
 
 Theory of mind composite score: Recent research has shown that a single 
coherent construct underpins various false-belief tasks (Wellman et al., 2001). This 
leads to the reliability of false belief scores becoming improved by the use of a 
composite score rather than individual tests (Hughes et al., 2000). Within the present 
study, there was also a positive correlation between first and second-order theory of 
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mind was significant (r = 0.56, p < .01). There was also adequate internal consistency 
between the two levels of false belief theory of mind understanding (Cα = 0.71). 
Consequently scores were summed to give a composite theory of mind score (0 to 6). 
The composite theory of mind score was used in all of the analyses conducted here.  
 
Imaginative Drawing 
 The Karmiloff-Smith (1990) drawing task, or adaptations of it, has been 
fruitfully used to study imagination in typically developing children (e.g., Hollis & 
Low, 2005; Zhi et al., 1997), children with ASD (e.g., Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996), 
and even typically developing adults (e.g., Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996). Following 
Hollis and Low, a slight modification to the presentation context of the Karmiloff-
Smith task was applied to make clear the task’s goal. Participants were first shown a 
picture of people walking towards a sparkling door that opened into a path leading to 
a different faraway planet in space. Participants were then told a story that when 
people walk through the magic door which transports them to go and live on a 
different planet, they get changed into funny, strange, pretend looking people that no 
one has ever seen before. Participants were then asked to draw three pictures of 
changed people, making each changed person as funny and strange looking as 
possible. Hollis and Low have argued that such minor modifications to the 
presentation of the drawing task helps children understand the task without sacrificing 
the essential structural requirement of explicitly manipulating knowledge to entertain 
and produce non-veridical content. It was further reasoned that the use of scores based 
on the proportion of imaginative ideas averaged over three drawings would increase 
the reliability of this behavioural measure relative to prior studies that operationalised 
their dependant measure of the ability to represent imaginative content based on a 
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single drawing (e.g., Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). Participants were instructed to 
depict each of their drawings on separate pieces of paper. Each drawing was taken 
away immediately after it was finished. No time limit was imposed. 
 After the drawings were completed, the experimenter invited participants to 
describe the content of each drawing that had been produced. All responses were 
praised and recorded. 
 Each figure drawn was coded according to whether or not it was imaginative. 
Scoring criteria and techniques used by Marsh et al. (1996) were followed; dividing 
the number of features that were imaginative by the total number of features drawn 
constituted the proportion of imaginative content for each picture. For example, one 
ASD participant drew a man with insect antennae as his pretend looking person. In 
this case there were a total of six main features: the head, face, body, arms/hands, 
legs/feet, and antennae. There was only one imaginative feature, the antennae. Hence, 
the proportion of imaginative content for that drawing was 0.17 (1/6). As a further 
example, one ASD participant drew and described his picture of a pretend looking 
person as having a thorny (having spikes) head, arms and legs. Correspondingly, there 
were three imaginative features (targeted to the head, arms/hands, and legs/feet) and 
two standard features (the face and body), and the proportion of imaginative content 
was calculated as 0.6 (3/5). When participants instead drew real looking people for 
their imaginative drawings, with standard looking heads, faces, arms/hands, bodies, 
and legs/feet, then the proportion of imaginative content was 0 (0/5). In this manner, 
the proportion of imaginative content was calculated for each drawing produced by 
participants in the ASD and TD groups. The overall mean proportion of imaginative 
content drawn was then calculated by averaging the proportion of scores across all 
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drawings produced. Overall agreement between two independent raters coding across 
all drawings (a combined total of 442 drawing features) was 95%. 
 Coding issues that arose between raters related to superficial changes that 
were possible in reality (e.g., hairstyle, multi-colour clothing); these were agreed to 
not constitute as imaginative features. Another coding issue related to whether a 
drawing constituted an instance of a pretend looking person when a completely 
different but unreal object or event was drawn. For example, one ASD participant 
drew various animals at the zoo. In such cases, the entities drawn actually exist in 
reality, and more importantly, do not measure up to another parameter set out by 
Karmiloff-Smith (1990) where successful instances of drawing pretend people “must 
introduce appropriate changes while simultaneously retaining core concepts of 
personhood” (p.62). As such, upon mutual discussion between the raters, agreement 
was reached whereby the drawings of real objects and entities were not considered as 
successful non-veridical instantiations. In these cases, participants received a zero 
score for the proportion of imaginative content found in those respective drawings. 
After the imaginative drawing task, it was also checked that participants were able to 
draw a normal looking human figure to begin with. All participants were able to do 
so. Such checks also helped in confirming that the content coded in the pretend people 
drawings did indeed constitute novel and imaginative drawings. Note also that 
participants were invited to draw a real looking person only after completing the 
imaginative drawing task, so that proponent activations arising from drawing a typical 
object did not spill into and inhibit impossible entity draw performance. 
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Symbolic Pretend Play 
 Following procedures used in previous research (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1987; 
Charman et al., 1998; Lewis & Boucher, 1988), the researcher emptied all of the toys 
from a box and spread them randomly over the floor. The toys included: (1) a toy tea-
set; (2) commercially available play people; (3) junk accessories – brick, straw, raw 
plug, cotton wool, cube and a box wrapped in metal foil; and (4) conventional toy 
accessories such as animals, cars and building blocks. Each child sat on a designated 
spot on the floor in front of all the toys. The video camera was then turned on. The 
researcher then led the child into the room to conduct the spontaneous play task. The 
child was directed to the toys with the instruction “You can play with anything on the 
floor in front of you”. The researcher sat away from the child and the toys. The child 
was filmed for five minutes. On completion of the five minutes the researcher joined 
the child placing the toys back in the toy box. 
Participants’ play was coded into one of five mutually exclusive categories: no 
play – the child did not engage in any play at this time; sensorimotor – play in this 
category was limited to sucking, throwing, banging, waving, rolling, twiddling or 
sniffing; ordering – lining up items, putting items inside one another, piling items up, 
or arranging by shape or colour; functional – play in which objects were used in ways 
appropriate to their conventional function; and symbolic – using an object as if it were 
another object, attributing properties to the object that it does not have, referring to 
absent objects as if they were there, making a collection of objects into a new object 
and animating dolls and animals (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Charman et al., 1998).  
These categories were chosen as they have been shown to represent a temporal 
developmental sequence; moving from complete disengagement through to simple 
play and then onto more complex play. The play session was coded using time 
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interval analysis (Libby, Powel, Messer and Jordan, 1998). Play behaviour was scored 
at 5-second intervals over the entire 5-minute session providing a coded set of scores 
for each participant covering 60 data points. Two independent raters first received 
intensive training on how to code play behaviour according to the above categories 
using data from a 5-minute play session from a typically developing child (whose data 
were reserved for training in coding purposes). After the training, the raters 
independently scored all of the pretend-play video sessions for all of the actual 28 
participants. They achieved a reliability of 0.92 across 1680 pretend-play data points. 
All disagreements were resolved after discussion.  
Raw frequencies of symbolic play were treated as the key measure of interest 
because this is the locus of pretend play difficulty that is often debated amongst 
autism researchers (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1987 versus Lewis & Boucher, 1988). In this 
study there were no significant group differences with respect to the other play 
categories, all ps > .05. 
 
Results 
Overall Group Differences 
The results of the MANOVA that included all key measures (chronological 
age, non-verbal ability, verbal mental age, imaginative drawing, symbolic play, 
generativity, visuospatial planning, cognitive flexibility and theory of mind) revealed 
a significant overall group difference: F(9, 18) = 5.31, p < .001; ηp2 = 0.73; observed 
power = 0.99). MANOVA assumptions were satisfied.   
Separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to test for 
significant differences between the groups on individual variables (see Table 1). 
There was a significant difference found between the groups in chronological age, 
Imaginative Ability  34 
 
with the ASD group being significantly older than controls (F(1, 26) = 4.71, p < .05). 
No significant difference was found between the groups in their verbal (F(1, 26) = 
0.03, p > .05) and non-verbal (F(1, 26) = 2.36, p > .05) ability – these results were 
expected as the groups were matched specifically on these scores.  
The ASD group scored significantly lower in imaginative drawing and also 
scored significantly lower on symbolic play. These results show a deficit in the 
spontaneous imaginative ability of children with ASD. Means and standard deviations 
of the imagination variables by group are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Group means, standard deviations and group differences on measures of interest 
 
 
Measure  
Group 
 
Mean 
Range 
Min---Max 
 
SD 
 
F 
 
Imaginative 
Drawing 
 
 
TD 
ASD 
 
0.65 
0.41 
 
0.13 
0.00 
 
0.93 
0.70 
 
0.22 
0.23 
  
8.08** 
Symbolic Play 
 
TD 
ASD 
13.43 
6.79 
2.00 
1.00 
26.00 
25.00 
7.50 
6.84 
 5.99* 
Generativity TD 
ASD 
 
0.66 
0.47 
0.22 
0.15 
0.93 
0.74 
0.18 
0.18 
 7.48* 
Visuospatial 
Planning 
TD 
ASD 
 
10.93 
8.14 
5.00 
2.00 
16.00 
15.00 
3.20 
3.51 
 4.83* 
Cognitive 
Flexibility 
TD 
ASD 
 
8.21 
5.14 
5.00 
0.00 
12.00 
12.00 
2.58 
4.52 
 4.88* 
Theory of 
Mind 
TD 
ASD 
 
3.86 
1.93 
1.00 
0.00 
6.00 
5.00 
1.61 
1.44 
 11.16** 
*p < .05, **p < .01  
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In relation to the underlying cognitive processes believed to underpin imagination, the 
results showed significant group differences in generativity, visuospatial planning and 
cognitive flexibility as well as in false belief theory of mind understanding (see Table 
1). For each of these cognitive abilities, the TD group scored significantly higher than 
the ASD group. In one sense, particular group differences found on false belief 
reasoning are consistent with extant cognitive theorizing that highlights a theory of 
mind deficit in children with ASD. However, much of the results also support 
growing research highlighting a limitation in the executive function of children with 
ASD, especially in the areas of cognitive flexibility, generativity and visuospatial 
planning. 
 
Within-Group Correlations 
Associations amongst chronological age, verbal mental age, non-verbal 
ability, cognitive flexibility, visuospatial planning, generativity, theory of mind, 
symbolic play and imaginative drawing were calculated for the ASD group and the 
TD group separately. This was followed by full partial correlations that controlled for 
general developmental factors (chronological age, VMA, and NVA).  
 For the ASD group, bivariate correlations indicated that imaginative drawing 
and symbolic play were both positively related to generativity and visuospatial 
planning (Table 2). Imaginative drawing and symbolic pretend play were also related 
to each other. These overall results did not change upon partial correlation (Table 3). 
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 Table 2 
 Significant bivariate correlations among measures of interest for the ASD group 
ASD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
1. Imaginative Drawing 
 
------        
2. Symbolic Play .58* ------       
3. Chronological Age .66*  ns ------      
4. Non-verbal Ability .58*  ns  ns ------     
5. Verbal Mental Age .62*  ns .69** .70** ------    
6. Generativity .77** .61*  ns .72** .67** ------   
7. Visuospatial Planning .84** .66*  ns .73** .66** .83** ------  
8. Cognitive Flexibility  ns  ns .69**  ns .75**  ns ns ------ 
9. Theory of Mind  ns  ns  ns .56* .84** .54* ns .65* 
 
  *p < .05, **p < .01, ns = non-significant 
 
Table 3 
Significant full partial correlations among measures of interest for the ASD group  
ASD 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
1. Imaginative Drawing ------     
2. Symbolic Play .61* ------    
3. Generativity .61* .65* ------   
4. Visuospatial Planning .87** .74** .63* ------  
5. Cognitive Flexibility  ns  ns  ns ns ------ 
6. Theory of Mind  ns  ns  ns ns ns 
                         *p < .05, **p < .01, ns = non-significant 
 
In the ASD group theory of mind was also correlated with generativity and 
cognitive flexibility (Table 2); however the relationship became non-significant once 
general developmental factors were controlled (Table 3). However, the positive 
bivariate association between generativity and visuospatial planning continued to be 
significant even after full partial correlation analysis.  
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For the TD group, bivariate correlations indicated positive associations 
amongst imaginative drawing and symbolic play with generativity and theory of mind 
(Table 4).  With the exception of the bivariate link between symbolic play and 
generativity, the other associations remained upon full partial correlation analysis 
(Table 5).   
 
Table 4 
 Significant bivariate correlations among measures of interest for the TD group 
TD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Imaginative Drawing ------        
2. Symbolic Play .65* ------       
3. Chronological Age  ns  ns ------      
4. Non-verbal Mental Age  ns  ns  ns ------     
5. Verbal Mental Age  ns  ns .78** .60* ------    
6. Generativity .69** .61*  ns .61* .57* ------   
7. Visuospatial Planning  ns  ns  ns  ns .72**  ns ------  
8. Cognitive Flexibility  ns .81** .54* .57* .58* .62* ns ------ 
9. Theory of Mind .84** .74**  ns .61*  ns .77** ns .64* 
    *p < .05, **p < .01, ns = non-significant 
 
Table 5 
Significant full partial correlations among measures of interest for the TD group  
TD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Imaginative Drawing ------     
2. Symbolic Play .63* ------    
3. Generativity .71*  ns ------   
4. Visuospatial Planning  ns  ns  ns ------  
5. Cognitive Flexibility  ns .75**  ns ns ------ 
6. Theory of Mind .81** .70* .73* ns ns 
                         *p < .05, **p < .01, ns = non-significant 
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In the TD group there was also a positive correlation between symbolic play 
and cognitive flexibility. A positive bivariate relationship was also present between 
generativity and cognitive flexibility, between cognitive flexibility and theory of 
mind, as well as between generativity and theory of mind (Table 4). However, the 
bivariate relationships between generativity and cognitive flexibility, and between 
cognitive flexibility and theory of mind, all ceased to be significant, once variance 
associated with non-verbal ability, chronological age and verbal mental age were 
removed (Table 5). Only the association between generativity and theory of mind 
remained significant upon full partial correlation analysis. 
 
Regression and Mediation Analyses 
ASD Group 
Bivariate and full partial correlation analyses indicated that generativity and 
visuospatial planning performance were both associated with the proportion of 
imaginative content drawn. These results were further refined by a regression analysis 
conducted to examine whether generativity and visuospatial planning each 
contributed unique variance to imaginative drawing content in the ASD group. In a 
stepwise linear regression analysis, the effects of chronological age (β = 0.52) (p > 
.05), verbal mental age (β = -0.07) (p > .05) and non-verbal ability (β = 0.35) (p > 
.05) were jointly removed at the first step (R2 = 0.51, F(3, 10) = 3.43, p > .05). 
Generativity and visuospatial planning scores were entered in the second and third 
steps respectively, in line with the theoretically guided hypothesis that successful 
solutions to the imaginative drawing task require participants to initially generate a 
novel idea before needing to spatially plan it (Turner, 1997, 1999; Leevers & Harris, 
1998). Variation in generativity was found to be a unique predictor of differences in 
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imaginative drawing content, independent of chronological age, VMA and NVA, β = 
0.65, ΔR2 = 0.19, ΔF(1, 9) = 5.87, p < .05. Visuospatial planning also accounted for 
further unique variance, β = 0.82, ΔR2 = 0.18, ΔF(1, 8) = 11.66, p < .01. The 
resolution in such results are still not sufficiently clear, because the theoretically 
guided prediction was that, for the ASD group, visuospatial planning would bridge 
the relationship between generativity and imaginative drawing content. The mediation 
prediction was tested using the computer programme ‘MedGraph’ (Jose, 2003). First, 
sample size and correlation coefficients between the variables of interest were 
entered. Second, the potential mediator (visuospatial planning) was regressed on 
generativity. Third, imaginative drawing content scores were regressed on both 
visuospatial planning and generativity. The relevant regression data were entered into 
the ‘MedGraph’ programme which analysed for mediation. These regression results 
are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 
Summary of regressions testing visuospatial planning mediating the relationship of 
generativity to imaginative drawing in ASD group 
  B SE β R R2 
Regression 1: 
Generativity on Planning  
 
Generativity 
 
16.61 
 
3.17 
 
0.83** 
 
0.83 
 
0.70** 
       
Regression 2: 
Generativity and Planning 
on Imaginative Drawing  
 
Generativity 
 Planning 
 
 0.29 
 0.04 
 
0.38 
0.02 
 
 0.22 
0.66* 
 
 
0.85 
 
 
0.72** 
  
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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The significance of Sobel’s z-value = 2.12, p < .05, revealed full mediation; when 
visuospatial planning as the mediator was considered, the correlation between 
generativity and imaginative drawing content reduced to a non-significant level and 
the β weight of the direct effect of generativity to imagination dropped to non-
significance.  
Bivariate and partial correlation analyses also indicated significant tripartite 
relationships involving generativity, visuospatial planning and symbolic pretend play 
in the ASD group. Whilst tripartite correlations can signify the potential for mediation 
relationships (Baron & Kenny, 1986), this study specifically expected there to be no 
mediation relationship for symbolic pretend play in the ASD group. As explained in 
the Introduction, visuospatial planning was not predicted to bridge the link between 
generativity and symbolic play because play actions, unlike drawing procedures, does 
not appear to weigh heavily upon fine mechanical skills or fine visual and spatial 
analysis (cf. Lillard, 1996; Low, 2006).  As expected, the MedGraph programme 
indicated that visuospatial planning did not mediate the relationship from generativity 
to symbolic pretend play (p > .05). However, because generativity and visuospatial 
planning were correlated to symbolic play, a regression analysis was performed to at 
least disambiguate the unique contributions of generativity and planning. In a 
stepwise linear regression analysis, the effects of chronological age, verbal mental age 
and non-verbal ability were jointly removed at the first step (R2 = 0.13, F(3, 10) = 
0.48, p > .05). Planning and generativity scores were entered in the second and third 
steps respectively, in order of bivariate correlation strength. Variation in planning was 
found to be a unique predictor of differences in symbolic play, independent of 
chronological age, VMA and NVA (ΔR2 = 0.47, ΔF(1, 9) = 10.48, p = .01). 
Generativity did not account for further unique variance once contributions associated 
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with planning were considered (ΔR2 = 0.05, ΔF(1, 8) = 1.03, p > .05). However, we 
need to remember that generativity and planning were also inter-correlated, and 
consequently, generativity could make independent contributions if it were entered 
into the second and not last step of the regression analysis. When the regression was 
re-run as such, generativity accounted for unique variance (ΔR2 = 0.38, ΔF(1, 9) = 
6.79, p < .05) but planning did not (ΔR2 = 0.14, ΔF(1, 9) = 3.13, p > .05). Overall, the 
regression analyses suggest that both generativity and visuospatial action planning 
capabilities may run parallel and feed into each other when it comes to the nature by 
which children with ASD execute pretend play.  
 
TD Group 
The correlation analyses for the TD group showed significant tripartite 
associations connecting generativity, theory of mind and imaginative drawing 
content. The existence of tripartite correlations suggests that mediational processes 
could be operating (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Compared to the theoretically predicted 
mediation analysis for the ASD group, testing for mediation in the TD group was 
data-guided. However, there is extant concurrent and longitudinal research with TD 
groups suggesting: (1) generativity can support the display and emergence of false 
belief reasoning (e.g., Peterson & Riggs, 1999) and (2) false belief reasoning supports 
creative thinking (e.g., Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999). Consequently, we may 
be reasonably confident in speculating that in typical development, generativity may 
be related to imagination but the bridging might be an indirect one that is linked via 
false belief reasoning. This mediation route was tested using the ‘MedGraph’ 
computer programme. First, sample size and correlation coefficients between the 
variables of interest were entered. Second, the potential mediator (theory of mind) 
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was regressed on the generativity. Third, imaginative drawing content scores were 
regressed on both generativity and theory of mind (see Table 7 for regression 
information).  
 
Table 7 
Summary of the regressions testing theory of mind mediating the relationship of 
generativity to imaginative in TD group 
  B SE β R R2 
 
Regression 1: 
Generativity on  
Theory of Mind 
 
Generativity 
 
6.99 
 
1.69 
 
0.77** 
 
0.77 
 
0.59** 
       
Regression 2: 
Generativity and Theory of 
Mind on Imaginative 
Drawing  
 
 
Generativity 
Theory of Mind 
 
0.14 
0.10 
 
0.31 
0.03 
 
 0.12 
0.75* 
 
 
0.84 
 
 
0.71** 
  
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
The relevant data were entered into the ‘MedGraph’ programme and the significance 
of Sobel’s z-value = 2.40, p < .05, revealed full mediation; when theory of mind as 
the mediator was considered, the correlation between generativity and imaginative 
drawing became non-significant and the β weight of the direct effect of generativity 
for imaginative drawings dropped to non-significance.  
Despite the routes in the mediation analysis for the TD group being consistent 
with some literature indicating that generativity is important for false belief reasoning 
(Peterson & Riggs, 1999), and that false belief understanding can support creative 
problem solving (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999), the analysis was still ad hoc. 
Given the concurrent nature of the data, it is prudent to be cautious in the 
interpretation by at least checking the potential for an initial route that begins with 
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variation in children’s theory of mind supporting generativity (see Perner, 1998). The 
possibility that generativity mediated the relationship from theory of mind to 
imagination in drawings was not significant (p > .05).  
Finally, the correlational analyses also showed significant tripartite 
associations between symbolic play, theory of mind and cognitive flexibility. 
MedGraph did not reveal any significant mediation (p > .05). To simply disambiguate 
the unique contributions of theory of mind and cognitive flexibility for symbolic play, 
a stepwise linear regression analysis was performed. The effects of chronological age, 
verbal mental age and non-verbal ability were jointly removed at the first step (R2 = 
0.26, F(3, 10) = 1.63, p > .05). Compared to the full partial correlation link between 
symbolic play and theory of mind (r = .70, p < .05), the correlation between cognitive 
flexibility and symbolic play was only slightly higher (r = .75, p < .01). Entering 
cognitive flexibility and theory of mind into the second and third steps of the 
regression analysis respectively, in order of bivariate correlation strength, would in 
some ways be parsimonious with Zelazo’s (2004) radical theoretical view that the 
development of cognitive flexibility can account for and subsume widespread changes 
in domain specific and domain general reasoning. However, in doing so, we would 
fail to take into account early precursors to theory of mind development that appear 
long before embedded rule reasoning capabilities (e.g., anticipatory gaze, joint 
attention, imitation). Indeed, this study included both first-order and second-order 
false belief reasoning to take into account, at least in some small way, the continuous 
nature of theory of mind development. Consequently, it was deemed safer on 
theoretical grounds for theory of mind scores and cognitive flexibility scores to be 
entered at the second and third steps of the regression analysis respectively. In doing 
so, the steps of the regression would also align with more moderate theoretical views 
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that both theory of mind and a variety of executive function skills play unique roles in 
children’s reasoning and problem solving (e.g., Carlson, 2003; Kloo & Perner, 2005). 
Variation in theory of mind was found to be a unique predictor of differences in 
symbolic play, independent of chronological age, VMA and NVA (ΔR2 = 0.32, ΔF(1, 
9) = 6.78, p = .05). Cognitive flexibility accounted for further unique variance once 
contributions associated with theory of mind were considered (ΔR2 = 0.19, ΔF(1, 8) = 
6.68, p > .05).  
 
Discussion  
 The current project was designed to assess underlying cognitive processes 
involved in imaginative ability. In order to achieve this goal, concurrent data on false 
belief theory of mind reasoning and executive function were collected from 14 
children with ASD and 14 TD controls. By measuring spontaneous symbolic pretend 
play and impossible entity drawing in every single participant, this project attempted 
to form empirical links between these two methods of demonstrating imaginative 
capability. The focus of this project was on the extent to which particular cognitive 
skills (theory of mind and executive function) might underpin imaginative ability. 
Before turning to discuss the findings, several of the key findings are briefly 
highlighted.  
 In relation to the findings of Baron-Cohen (1987; Scott and Baron-Cohen, 
1996), the present study also uncovered a significant difference in symbolic play 
production and imaginative drawing between the ASD and TD groups. Given an 
observed concurrent difference in false belief reasoning between the two groups as 
well, autism imagination deficits could be interpreted in terms of impairments in 
theory of mind. Such an interpretation would only be at the group level, and would 
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not speak about the involvement of theory of mind at the individual level. Indeed, in 
support of executive function researchers (e.g., Jarrold et al., 1996; Leevers & Harris, 
1998; Turner, 1999; Zelazo, 2004), the ASD group also showed significantly lower 
scores in generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility compared to the 
TD group. Underlying the current study was the principle that if a particular cognitive 
deficit is principally responsible for imagination deficits in ASD, then variance in that 
cognitive skill should be related to the extent and variability of imagination shown. 
The general and overarching prediction of this project was that variations in 
imagination seen in children with ASD would be more strongly associated with 
executive function compared with theory of mind false belief reasoning. This 
prediction was partially supported; with generativity and planning but not cognitive 
flexibility, showing significant associations with symbolic pretend play and 
impossible entity drawing in the ASD group; false-belief understanding was not 
correlated to imaginative ability. Fitting with the hypotheses, the relationship between 
generativity and imaginative drawings turned out to be mediated by visuospatial 
planning. The current results support generativity and planning as integral parts of the 
broader imaginative process, especially for children with ASD.  
In the TD group, theory of mind was related to both measures of imagination, 
even when the influence of general development (i.e., chronological age, non-verbal 
ability and verbal mental age) was controlled. Cognitive flexibility was related to 
symbolic play but not imaginative drawing (both with and without the effect of 
general development). Similar to the ASD group, generativity was associated with 
imaginative drawing in the TD group. Dissimilar to the ASD group, however, the 
association between generativity and imaginative drawings was mediated through 
theory of mind.  
Imaginative Ability  46 
 
Understanding the Findings 
 In considering possible explanations for the results there is a need to explain 
why particular cognitive processes may individually, and in combination, be 
influencing imaginative ability. With respect to imagination ability in ASD, Turner 
(1997) and Jarrold et al. (1996) have argued generativity to be a key locus of 
difficulty where virtual symbolic production is concerned. Indeed, one logical first 
step to creative problem solving is to generate a hypothetical idea or scheme. Fitting 
with Turner, Jarrold and colleagues’ view, individual differences in generativity were 
related to variance in pretend play and drawings in the ASD group. However, 
generativity aside, and especially in the drawing modality, further sub-processes may 
be involved in spontaneous imagination. In this case, planning may specifically be 
implicated at several finer levels of problem solving. First, children need to construct 
a visuospatial representation of the generated drawing idea in working memory 
(Leevers & Harris, 1998). Following that, children need to execute the particular plan 
whilst maintaining it in working memory and matching the drawing that is unfolding 
in relation to the satisfaction of that plan. Without some degree of concurrent ability 
to graphically plan and translate the generated novel ideas for imagination, 
individuals with ASD may instead execute more familiar schemes. This may explain 
why the impact of generativity for imaginative drawings in ASD was mediated 
through variance in visuospatial planning.  
However, why did visuospatial planning not mediate the effects of 
generativity for pretend play in the ASD group? It is possible that differences in how 
the two executive skills were recruited were a manifestation of or adaptation to task 
difficulty. While both the drawing and play tasks are measures of imagination, they 
have different processing complexities (and even developmental timetables). In the 
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play task, props are provided and physically present at all times, and children are free 
to incorporate as few or as many of the different sets of toys into their symbolic play.  
Participants could, for example, generate and plan out a play idea with some of the 
toys (e.g., rolling a toy car over a sequentially arranged set of blocks to represent a 
bridge). Participants, however, do not necessarily need to playfully integrate every 
single toy into highly complex play. Participants, after playing with some toys, could 
even abandon them to generate and plan new play ideas with other objects. Each toy 
could even become a fresh starting point from which another imaginative idea may be 
generated. In this sense, generativity and planning may be independently used to 
support symbolic pretend play on a relatively rapid moment-by-moment basis. Of 
course, the lack of a tight sequential coupling between generativity and visuospatial 
planning in the play task could instead reflect that there might have been a lack of 
complexity or organization in ASD children’s play, even amongst individuals who did 
show some signs of symbolic behaviour. Without an assessment of what toys were 
used or the extent to which different groups of objects were used in an inter-connected 
fashion, it is difficult to theoretically pin down why executive skills worked in parallel 
and contributed independently to pretend play. However, a different set of skills 
(theory of mind and cognitive flexibility) contributed to the TD group’s pretend play, 
but these two skills also contributed independently to pretend play. In the TD group, 
cognitive skill contributions for imaginative drawings were also revealed in a 
mediational fashion. This suggests that both groups of children may have found the 
drawing task more complex than the play task, and responded to them accordingly, 
albeit recruiting different types of cognitive processes. 
   It is then possible to appreciate why cognitive skills might need to work in 
connection with each other (e.g., mediation) in the drawing context. In the drawing 
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task, there is no physically present cue to guide children’s graphic production. 
Children have to rely on and maintain the generated idea in working memory, and 
attempt to (re)produce the idea on paper. Given that generated ideas held in the 
sketch-pad component of working memory are potentially fast-fading, it is important 
for children to recruit visuospatial planning abilities to pull off their drawing 
production (van Sommers, 1995). Drawings, may also call upon fine motor or graphic 
coordination (e.g., for joining lines and connecting shapes) that necessitates some 
level of visuospatial proficiency. Furthermore, unlike the play task, participants in the 
drawing task cannot so readily move to the next graphic production until the first idea 
is seen through to the end and completed on paper. In order to begin producing the 
next drawing, participants need to work towards ensuring that the first drawing idea 
materializes on paper. Consequently, the processing complexities of drawing may 
specifically require executive skills such as generativity and visuospatial planning to 
work in sequence with each other.  
In a different but related sense, the mediation underpinning ASD participants’ 
impossible entity drawing but not for symbolic pretend play may even reflect different 
working memory resources required by both tasks. Unfortunately, there was no 
measure of working memory ability in the present study. It is important for future 
research to include such measures (e.g., digit span) to find out whether generativity 
and visuospatial planning complexities uniquely underpin imaginative ability, or 
whether individual differences in the effects of generativity and planning reflect the 
operation of broader third party variables such as working memory.     
The findings that visuospatial planning ability was related to both measures of 
imagination in the ASD group but not in the TD control group tantalisingly suggest 
that imagination in ASD might be visualisation based. Visuospatial planning bridging 
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generativity with imaginative drawings in the ASD group may be interpreted as some 
children with ASD indirectly adopting a strategy of abstracting schematic impressions 
of their generated ideas, and then perceptually manipulating them to allow creative 
solutions to be realised (Barsalou, 1999). Interpreted as such, visuospatial planning 
contributing to imagination in ASD is broadly convergent with accumulating 
accounts of some individuals with ASD preferring to use a visual thinking style (e.g., 
Kana et al., 2006). On a cautionary note, the visuospatial channelling of generated 
ideas for imagination in ASD may not be always sufficient or successful where 
problem solving is concerned. While the generation of relatively straightforward 
ideas for imagination may be grounded in some form of perceptual analysis, the 
translation and on-line monitoring of highly complex drawing solutions would 
severely tax the capacity limit of imagery resources in working memory (van 
Sommers, 1995) – this may explain why there is still an overall ASD group deficit in 
imaginative drawing content. Moreover, if individuals with ASD generate novel ideas 
at a very slow rate, there would only be a limited set of schemes to creatively draw 
and plan from, and individuals may in longitudinal assessments start to show 
repetition in their imaginative drawing ideas. Indeed, the correlation between 
generativity and imagination (in the drawing context) for the ASD group, although 
significant, was smaller than the same relationship found for the TD group.  
Another interesting point for discussion revolves around how ideational 
generativity was mediated through visuospatial planning for imaginative drawings in 
the ASD group but mediated through false belief theory of mind reasoning in the TD 
group. False belief reasoning ability was also independently related to symbolic 
pretend play in the TD group. In one sense, it could be argued that theory of mind is 
naturally and normally implicated in how ideas are imaginatively manifested. 
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Understanding of mental states may not turn out to be associated with imagination in 
ASD because modular abnormalities in theory of mind could lead individuals to 
develop specialisation in engaging generativity alongside, or in relation to, planning 
for imagination. This possibility is a compelling one but faces some interpretive 
challenges. First, the mediational analysis for the TD group suggested that the means 
to imagination, at least for drawings, potentially begins from relating generativity to 
false belief reasoning. Confidence in such data is also bolstered by other concurrent 
and longitudinal research showing that there is a stronger direction of effect from 
executive functioning to false belief understanding than the reverse (e.g., Carlson, 
2003; Hughes, 1998). Moreover, several individuals with ASD did exhibit some level 
of false belief understanding, albeit achieved through a linguistically based route 
(suggested via a slightly higher correlation with receptive language ability, as seen in 
the bivariate correlation analyses). In this case, the fact that false belief knowledge 
still did not correlate with imagination in ASD, suggests that individuals may have 
failed to apply that understanding to process imaginative thinking tasks due to parallel 
limitations in executive functioning skills (Zelazo & Müller, 2002). The application 
of generativity and planning in the ASD group may reflect an uneven profile in 
executive function: selection of these processes in the ASD group may be due to 
greater limitations in false belief understanding and cognitive flexibility than in 
generativity and planning. It is also possible that failure to apply false belief 
understanding to imagination tasks might stem from impaired cross talk between 
brain systems governing domain specific and general reasoning.  Consequently, it is 
possible to extrapolate that, for individuals with ASD, spontaneous imagination may 
be based more upon executive routes and their organizational irregularities, 
irrespective of gained false belief understanding. Relatedly, false belief reasoning 
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may have been used to handle imagination in typical development because 
individuals in the control group possessed effective executive control and can use 
language to service executive control. Finally, meta-representational focused accounts 
do not readily explain why children with ASD also show generativity impairments in 
reality based tasks that require action flexibility (e.g., word generation and free recall; 
see Boucher & Lewis, 1989). The above interpretive challenges aside, false belief 
reasoning still served as a process for bringing out imaginative ability, at least in 
typical development. The critical even-handed point may simply be that, given that 
executive function skills such as generativity and cognitive flexibility were also 
related to impossible entity drawings and symbolic play respectively in the TD group, 
strengths in mentalistic understanding may not singularly contribute at a super-
ordinate level to relative successes in imagination. Both theory of mind and executive 
function may simply work together to bring out imagination in typical development. 
It is still important to be mindful of the possibility that theory of mind may yet turn 
out to have developmental primacy for how we interpret the underpinnings of 
imagination in TD and ASD groups, as its foundational skills (not measured here) 
(e.g., anticipatory eye gaze, joint attention, imitation) may be significantly related to 
individual and group differences in imaginative ability.  
The current findings show generativity to be a common executive skill that is 
recruited by both the TD and ASD groups. Speaking towards the importance of 
executive function, the present data across the ASD and TD groups suggest that 
generativity is necessary for imagination but its effects may be differentially 
processed or routed in ASD and in typical development. The findings that 
generativity is linked with planning for imaginative drawings in the ASD group but 
instead expressed through false belief reasoning in the TD group could more 
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generally suggest “cool” detached cognitive control over imagination in ASD, but 
“cool” and “hot” control over non-veridical drawing representations in typical 
development (cf. Zelazo & Mueller, 2000). “Cool” cognitive measures include those 
that operate on abstract reasoning and decontextualized problem solving such as the 
Mazes task, the Tower of Hanoi task, the DCCS, and design fluency tasks. In 
contrast, “hot” cognitive control is invoked when participants care about or have an 
emotional connection to the tasks they are trying to solve (Zelazo, Qu, & Müller, 
2005). Zelazo et al. view “hot” measures to include mentalistic tasks such as false 
belief scenarios where interpretations of meaningful concrete socially relevant 
information (people’s knowledge, beliefs and desires) are required. Similarly, then, 
the fact that false belief understanding and cognitive flexibility (on the DCCS) are 
both related to pretend play in the TD group could suggest the operation of both hot 
and cool cognitive control over typical problem solving in the play modality. Here it 
is worth noting that ‘cool’ cognitive flexibility did not relate to imaginative drawings 
but only to pretend play in the TD group. It is unlikely that cognitive flexibility is not 
necessary for imaginative drawings per se, but rather the relationship may be stronger 
in the play modality because the TD participants may have been proactive in 
switching between and consecutively incorporating all the toy items (cf. Dick et al., 
2005). This relates back to an earlier point made in the discussion that it would be 
worthwhile for future research to look at variability with the nature and style of play 
between ASD and TD groups.  
Suggestively, theory of mind by being related to imagination in the TD group 
could mean that neuro-typical children may also feel emotionally connected to their 
drawings, play and problem solving in general (e.g., find pride, sense of 
accomplishment, and invest intentional communicative value in the solutions and 
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actions). Indeed, the revelation of theory of mind being also related to imagination 
could also suggest that that typically developing children are able to meta-reflect on 
their creative actions and on the domain general skills by which they use to produce 
those actions (Lillard, 1996; Perner, 1998). In contrast, the absence of theory of mind 
being involved with imagination in the ASD group could potentially mean that these 
individuals perceived (unreflectively) the drawing and play tasks as simple exercises 
of logic. The children in the ASD group, even those who were successful in 
producing imaginative drawings and play, may be emotionally disconnected to the 
final products of their effort. Overall, even though executive function may be 
important to imaginative ability for both children with ASD and typically developing 
children at the level of product, only TD children, perhaps with recourse to implicit 
mentalising skills, may find imagination challenging and affectively rewarding.  
   
Limitations  
 In light of the concurrent nature of the present data (and a moderate number of 
comparisons to yield the correlations), it is not possible to make strong causal claims 
about how generativity and planning may have come to be developmentally 
associated for imagination in ASD (or whether generativity and planning would also 
be important for even younger typically developing children). Steps toward clarifying 
such issues could include future research examining whether training in generativity 
and planning are jointly necessary for prompting imagination in ASD or whether 
support training in either executive component could sufficiently cue imagination. 
Although the hypotheses in the current project were theoretically informed and 
guided, it must be acknowledged that the study included a relatively small participant 
sample. The sample size makes generalizability to the autism spectrum of cognitive 
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abilities difficult. It would therefore be advantageous to include a larger participant 
group, composing of distinct subgroups differentiated by ability; further research 
would benefit from separating the autism and Asperger’s subgroups and examining 
individual differences between as well as within them. It would also be prudent to 
include an even more diverse set of executive function measures (e.g., working 
memory, inhibitory control) and core theory of mind measures (e.g., imitation, joint-
attention, eye gaze) to thoroughly assess domain general and domain specific 
underpinnings of imagination.  
 
Implications 
 The present project has highlighted separate cognitive processes contributing 
to the imaginative capabilities of TD children and children with ASD. By focusing 
efforts on the relative strengths of children with ASD (generativity and planning) as 
well as the more impaired areas (theory of mind and cognitive flexibility), 
interventions may be more successful. Strategies to further develop imaginative 
ability should include skills training in generating alternative novel ideas by varying 
degrees of support (e.g., completing task with physical cues and/or social prompts and 
gradually expanding to completing tasks in a self-directed unprompted manner). 
Likewise, strategies to elicit more organizational and visuospatial planning skills in 
children with ASD would improve their imaginative ability. A graded approach to 
advancing spontaneous planning strategies (e.g., beginning with diagrammatic 
techniques such as mind mapping) would place children with ASD in a better position 
to produce more symbolic pretend play and imaginative drawings. 
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Conclusion  
 The current study investigated the cognitive underpinnings of imagination in 
children with ASD through imaginative drawing and symbolic pretend play 
production. Links between the variation in imaginative flexibility with theory of mind 
and executive function were explored. The executive abilities to generate ideas and 
visuospatially plan actions were found to be especially important for imagination in 
children with ASD. Typically developing children’s performances were underpinned 
by executive skills in generativity and cognitive flexibility, and also theory of mind. 
On balance, the extent to which executive function skills are relied upon (whether in 
relation to each other or in relation to domain specific theory of mind skill) can 
contribute to explaining the extent and nature of imagination in ASD and in typical 
development.  
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